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State intelligence agencies and the far Right

A review of developments in Germany, Hungary and Austria

On 17 April 2013, the trial of Beate Zschäpe, the sole surviving member of the National Socialist Underground (NSU) and four co-defendants, on charges relating to ten murders will open at the Higher Regional Court in Munich. Their victims were all shot in the head at close range between 2000 and 2007. The existence of this German neo-Nazi terrorist cell and its murderous campaign only came to light in November 2011 after the police pursuit of two men involved in a bank robbery in Eisenach, Thuringia. This culminated in a shoot-out, and the bodies of Uwe Mundlos and Uwe Böhnhardt (who it appears shot themselves in a joint suicide pact) were retrieved from the wreckage of the burnt-out vehicle they had been travelling in. This, the largest trial to date on far-right extremism in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, is expected to last a year, involves ten defence lawyers, sixty co-plaintiffs and almost forty lawyers for ancillary lawsuits.

But while the international spotlight focuses on Munich, very little attention has been paid to proceedings at the most significant trial on far-right extremism in recent years in eastern Europe. At the Pest County High Court in Hungary, an estimated 160 witnesses have been giving evidence since March 2011 against four neo-Nazis accused of the serial killings of six Roma and other crimes.¹ Another under-reported event was the January 2013 police raids on the Austrian headquarters of the neo-Nazi criminal fraternity, Objekt 21, during

which Nazi propaganda, sawn-off shotguns, machine guns and explosives were seized. Evidence has now emerged that the neo-Nazis - funding their activities through prostitution, the trade in drugs and arms - had close ties with the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD),² as well as neo-Nazis in Thuringia, the home state of the NSU.³ It is anticipated that in the case against Objekt 21 charges will be brought against around sixty people, including two German neo-nazis. One neo-Nazi widely believed to be the leader of Objekt 21 has set up on Facebook a 'Freedom for Wolle' page to support Ralf Wohlleben,⁴ a former NPD official who is one of the four co-defendants at the NSU trial. Wohlleben, who like the NSU trio was active in *Thüringer Heimatschutz* (Thuringia Homeland Security, THS) in the 1990s, is widely believed to have shielded Mundlos, Böhnhardt and Zschäpe in 1998, when they were forced to go on the run after a police haul of explosives and weapons at the garage they were renting in Jena, Thuringia.

The need for scrutiny

Journalists will no doubt gather in Munich for the NSU trial – though their access will be limited. For the court's president has announced that access to the proceedings will be restricted to fifty journalists and fifty members of the public (ignoring the precedent for openness set by the Norwegian government during the trial of Anders



Beate Zschäpe, Uwe Böhnhardt and Uwe Mundlos

Behring Breivik). Since eight of the NSU's ten victims were either Turkish or of Turkish origin, the court authorities triggered a diplomatic incident by refusing to guarantee seats for the Turkish ambassador and a representative of the Turkish parliament's human rights committee.⁵ Then, at the end of March a new wave of protest occurred when it revealed that places for journalists had been allocated on a first come, first served basis— with the foreign media, including that from Turkey completely left out.

Each of the three cases merits media scrutiny. Not only are neo-Nazis accused of murder and other serious crimes, but also facts point to failures on the part of the police and the intelligence services. The attempts to cover up the extent of the network of permanent informants within the neo-Nazi scene in Germany was particularly scandalous, but so too was the operational bias towards the far Right in Austria.

We are aware of some of the facts, thanks to official inquiries by parliamentary sub-committees in Germany and Hungary and investigations by journalists and anti-racist monitors, such as the blog *Cigányvadászatper* in Hungary, the Archive for Documentation of Austrian Resistance and the Antifa-Network, and the Network Against Racism and Right-wing Extremism in Austria. From these sources have come serious allegations of everyday indifference and institutionalised negligence within law enforcement, driven, in part, by the hierarchies and rivalries between and within the intelligence and police services.

Germany with its sixteen regional states has sixteen domestic security services and police forces, in addition to the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (*Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz* BfV). Thus the parliaments of Bavaria, Thuringia and Saxony established separate inquiries. The NSU originally hailed from Thuringia, so the failures of its domestic intelligence services since the 1990s is particularly pertinent. But in January 2012, a cross-party parliamentary commission of inquiry under the chairmanship of Sebastian Edathy (SPD) was tasked with investigating why thirty-four separate police and intelligence agencies were unable to apprehend the NSU.

This inquiry had the power to scrutinise all documents and files of the security services. But as it went into session, it quickly emerged that crucial files had been shredded or gone missing. Key witnesses also seemed to suffer from memory lapse. As the scandal

grew, heads began to roll. The chief of the BfV was the first to resign over the shredding of documents, quickly followed by his counterparts at the state level in Thuringia, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Berlin. The scandal is now spreading to senior politicians, as it recently emerged that, in Thuringia, the ministry of the interior gave false information to a freedom of information request submitted by Marina Renner, the Die Linke parliamentarian on the NSU inquiry. The ministry had responded that it had no paid informants in the neo-Nazi scene. But it has now emerged that it had.⁶ The Berlin interior minister, Frank Henkel, is also under pressure after failing to show up to a parliamentary inquiry session specifically rescheduled for him, while information requested by the parliamentary investigation (on paid informer Thomas S) has been withheld by his department.⁷



House firebombed at Tatárszentgyörgy in 2009. A father and son were shot dead as they fled.

In Hungary, information about intelligence services' operational failures can be found in the report of the 'Committee to review the failure of the secret services in the case of the Roma assassinations'. This task force of three parliamentarians under the chairmanship of József Gulyás (Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDSZ) was established by the Security Committee of Parliament in November 2009 to carry out a thirty-day investigation into the serial killings of the six Roma and related crimes. A summary of the parliamentarians' findings was subsequently published⁸ (supplemented by a later report authored by Gulyás for the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, TASZ).⁹ But the full report of the Committee, which includes supporting evidence, remains a state secret (on grounds of national security) under an eighty-year rule.

In Austria, where the raids and arrests of Objekt 21

occurred in January 2013, and formal charges and the date for the trial of the neo-nazis arrested has not yet been set, the government has resisted calls for a full inquiry. But the leaks of information about the failure of the police and the Regional Office for the Protection of the Constitution Upper Austria (LVT) are mounting. These have been documented by anti-racist organisations and an investigative report in the liberal magazine *Profil*¹⁰. Under pressure from the media and anti-fascist organisations, the regional parliament of Upper Austria has, if reluctantly, set up a sub-committee to investigate Objekt 21. Its remit is just to investigate 'extremism', as the Conservatives blocked attempts to widen the range into 'far-right extremism'.¹¹

The crimes

The intelligence services' failures to recognise the dangers posed by the far Right have undoubtedly contributed to the deaths of at least seventeen people. In ways, which differ from country to country, the services' lack of action – from downgrading investigations into the far Right to ignoring signs of preparation for violence – is palpable.



■ The four men currently on trial in Pest are accused of twenty attacks in nine small towns and villages in central and eastern Hungary during which six Roma, including a 5-year-old child, perished, and forming a 'private army to ignite civil war'. If the Hungarian National Security Office (NSO) had only utilised its IT capacities, evaluated and shared its information with the police and other bodies investigating the murders and other crimes, they could probably have arrested the neo-Nazis earlier and prevented at least some of the murders. In 2008, the four men standing trial – but especially István Kiss (2nd accused) – had been on the radar of the intelligence services as an officer deployed in Hadjú-Bihard County submitted documents to the Budapest legal office of the NSO that the neo-Nazis were intent on gaining weapons. But the NSO took the decision to suspend the surveillance (including phone taps) just prior to the

first of the serious attacks in July 2008 when fifteen rounds were fired at three Romani homes in Galgagyörk, a small village near Budapest. Subsequently, the serial murder of Roma was not a priority for the intelligence services. This was underlined in 2009 and on other occasions by József Gulyás, chair of the 'Committee to review the failure of the secret services in the case of the Roma assassinations'. He concluded that there were operational failures at the highest level since the intelligence services repeatedly failed to prioritise the murder of the Roma and to pass relevant information to police investigators.¹²

■ The failure of the LVT in Upper Austria to clamp down on Objekt 21 gave the neo-Nazis the opportunity to expand their criminal activities in the red-light districts of Vienna where they are estimated to have damaged business to the tune of at least €3.5million.¹³ Objekt 21 attracted media attention in 2010 when its rock parties at the farm it rented in Desselbrunn attracted neo-Nazis from across the central region of Upper Austria and neighbouring Bavaria. Yet it was not until the Autumn of 2010 that the LVT ordered raids, which even then did not lead to any prosecutions. Even a ban on the organisation in February 2011 did not fully galvanise the LVT, as Nazi merchandise was still being sold via the internet shop Nordic Squad registered to the Desselbrunn address. Criminal charges were laid against six people in May 2011, yet remained at the public attorney's office in Wels, without being processed.¹⁴

The murderous campaign of the NSU only came to light in November 2011, following the deaths of Uwe Mundlos and Uwe Böhnhardt. Weapons and other incriminating evidence were retrieved from the charred remains of the apartment that the surviving NSU-member, Beate Zschäpe had set on fire. The incompetence and failures of the German intelligence services allowed the NSU trio to roam free, carrying out armed robberies, at least ten murders and countless other crimes. The errors include the following:

■ In 1998, pipe bombs, 1.4 kilos of TNT and death threats to foreigners were found in garages and apartments in Jena (Thuringia) rented by the NSU trio (known members at that time of the THS). Warrants and multiple charges were levelled against the three, who disappeared, though under observation by the security agency of Thuringia. The Public Attorney's Office in Gera, Thuringia, closed proceedings against Mundlos in 2003,

withdrawing his name from police databases of wanted criminals and is unable to explain why.¹⁵

■ A list of contacts and addresses found in the 1998 raids list was not properly processed and the contacts not investigated. When the list was analysed years later, it became clear that many of the names were of those who played a role in assisting the NSU members to stay underground - during which time they committed the ten murders.¹⁶

■ A claim was made in the *Welt am Sonntag* that Thomas S, an informant on the far-right scene gave his Berlin police handler a tipoff on the trio's whereabouts in 2002, four years after they disappeared from public view to avoid arrest over a series of attempted bombings. It is unclear whether the Berlin police passed their tip to the federal police. Thomas S worked for Berlin police from 2000 until 2011.¹⁷

■ One of the NSU's ten victims was policewoman Michèle Kiesewetter, who was shot dead and a colleague wounded, as they ate lunch in their patrol car in Heilbronn (Baden-Württemberg) in 2007.¹⁸ The parliamentary commission considered allegations that the tip-off of her whereabouts had to come from within the police. She had swapped shifts at the last minute, suggesting that someone with insider information had told her killers details of where she would be working. The interior ministry in Baden-Württemberg confirmed that two police officers in the state had been members of the European White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and that they are still uniformed serving police officers – one in the normal police, another a squad commander for riot control police. Both were her colleagues – one her immediate superior in the riot police. The authorities had been aware of the allegations since 2003, when



Police officer Michèle Kiesewetter - a victim of the NSU

they uncovered evidence of the officers' temporary membership during a search of the KKK leader's apartment in the city of Schwäbisch Hall. A neo-Nazi paid informant known as 'Corelli', who has now been outed by the German media as a co-founder of the KKK in Germany, is believed to be the source of information about the police officers, but according to the Baden-Württemberg Interior Ministry his information is 'not verifiable'.¹⁹

From symptoms to causes

But what is slowly emerging from these cases, and especially the NSU one in Germany, is that something beyond mere incompetence has to be addressed. Sebastian Edathy, the chair of the inquiry, speaks of a catalogue of mistakes caused by ignorance, wrong analyses and prejudiced thinking.²⁰ The various failures of different countries to protect Roma and others from a minority background from the racist violence of the far Right is not just about human error or institutional rivalries of unaccountable law-enforcement agencies. These are symptoms not causes. The failure to take the far Right seriously points towards institutionalised racism. This has been defined as 'the collective failure of an organisation to provide and appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people.'²¹

While 'the collective failure' manifests itself in different ways in the three different countries under review, its starting point is the same. National security is not seen in terms of human security (of citizens) but the security of the state. The intelligence agencies concentrate on the potential threat from Islamists, left-wing groups, anarchists, etc rather than that from the far Right. Until the 2011 massacre in Norway carried out by Anders Behring Breivik, which started with a bomb attack on government offices in Oslo, the far Right were simply not a priority for European intelligence services. As ultra-patriots they were not seen as a direct threat to the State, so the threat they posed to communities was downgraded as a priority.²²

Bias and institutionalised racism

According to the German-Turkish community leader Kenan Kolat 'the state and certain organs of the state are blind to the (extreme) right'.²³ It was this blind spot that Uwe Sailer, a former detective at the LVT and expert on

internet hate, highlighted when he told the magazine *Profil* that, during his tenure in Upper Austria, the number of agents working on the far Right was cut from five to three, with two of the three remaining agents openly sympathetic to the far Right.²⁴ In March 2013, National Assembly member Sonja Ablinger (SPÖ) called for a wide-ranging inquiry into Objekt 21, which would investigate allegations of institutionalised pro-Right bias in LVT agents. The regional police of Upper Austria, though officially denying Sailer's allegations, has pointedly failed to successfully counter them.

In Germany, though intelligence services were obviously to blame for not sharing information with the police, the police in any event were using racist stereotypes and prejudices towards victims which hampered their inquiries. They systematically failed to investigate a possible far-right motive in the many murders, instead blinkeredly believing that victims were involved with Turkish crime syndicates. Their investigation, code-named Operation Bosphorus, involved 150 officers who investigated 11,000 people, setting up fake kebab shops and infiltrating the families of victims so as to gain inside information.

Nor were the Hungarian police free of bias and professional misconduct, as documented in a report by three NGOs²⁵ which focussed on the police handling of the 2009 murders at Tatárszentgyörgy where a father and son were shot and killed as they fled a building which had been set on fire with Molotov cocktails. The police officer on duty and a forensic expert at the crime scene both failed to see the victim's gunshot wounds, and, as a result, the attack and murders were classified as a result of a domestic fire. The Head of the National Police subsequently concurred with the NGO's findings stating that the police had violated the constitutional rights of the victims.²⁶

Accountability and collusion

Infiltration is of course nothing new. In fact one of the most disturbing revelations from these three cases has been the fact that authorities failed to act in part because they were reluctant to compromise informant schemes. This was particularly evident in Germany where police and security services' failed to work together on the NSU murders, because of their permanent informer schemes within the far Right. Permanent informers used to penetrate criminal networks have been extended to the far Right. They are paid for their services, which could be over a period of many years²⁷



Internet cafe where Halit Yozgat was murdered

and represent a huge investment for the security services. During the German parliamentary inquiry, it became clear that the culture within state agencies (driven by intense rivalry), to maintain information lines within the neo-Nazi movement and protect their informers from prosecution, took precedence over law enforcement.

Germany's permanent informer scheme was criticised before when an attempt to ban the NPD in 2003 failed because the Federal Constitutional Court took the view that the intelligence services had so many informants within the party, it was effectively running it! But criticism now focuses on the institutional culture in intelligence-gathering agencies with its anathema for sharing information and lack of democratic procedures. With barely any mechanisms to ensure parliamentary oversight or accountability, political commentators are fearful that German security services are a law unto themselves and a threat to the constitutional state. It has already been reported in the media that an employee of the Hesse LVT was present at the NSU murder of Halit Yozgat in an internet cafe in Kassel, and that the security services, in order to protect their agent's anonymity, tried to impede the investigations of the homicide division.²⁸ Ralf Wohlleben who is about to appear in the forthcoming NSU trial, charged with assisting the NSU by, among other things providing the pistol used in nine of the murders, is believed to have been employed at some stage by one of Germany's sixteen security services as an informer.²⁹

The risks posed by neo-Nazi informers, acting as agent provocateurs or helping to finance violence, had already been flagged up. In the late 1990s, an informer, given the green light by his controllers, became a law unto himself, importing arms, explosives and preparing bombs with other neo-Nazis, one on a regional court in



Neo-Nazi informer Tino Brandt

Hannover.³⁰ And in a suppressed 1997 paper, now made public by *Der Spiegel* senior police officers warned that the security agencies might inadvertently strengthen the far Right if its large network of far-right informants ended up acting as incendiary agents and expressed concern that if they warned the intelligence services of impending raids, they would pre-warn informants, with 'the risk that evidence would be destroyed prior to the arrival of law enforcement authorities.'³¹

One of the files that parliamentarians recently requested, but could not see because it had been shredded, related to informer Tino Brandt, a former vice-president of the NPD in Thuringia and one of the founders of the THS from which the NSU emerged. He was said to have supplied the Thuringian Regional Office for the Protection of the Constitution with information from 1994-2001, during which time he was paid more than US\$132,000—which he now claims to have reinvested in the neo-Nazi scene.³²

It is also known that informers withheld crucial information from their handlers and that handlers undermined law enforcement by tipping off their informants about impending police raids, ensuring that crucial evidence was destroyed. In Austria, Erich Ruzowitzky, the landlord of the farm that the neo Nazis were renting in Desselbrunn told the press that a member of Objekt 21 had confided in him that they had friends within the police who gave them warning about impending raids.³³ In Germany, Tino Brandt received prior warning from the Thuringian Office for Protection of the Constitution when his place was about to be raided.³⁴

Military intelligence

But the dubious role of informers extends into military intelligence; Germany and Hungary have both recruited neo-Nazis as informers. Not much is known about the Hungarian military intelligence's role, as the parliamen-

tary commission investigating the serial killing of the Roma was merely tasked with examining the activities of the National Security Office, and not its working relationship with the Military Security Office (MSO). But during the course of the inquiry, reports appeared in the media suggesting that one of the neo-nazis charged, István Csontos (the fourth accused in the case, who, previously had served as a professional soldier) had at some point acted as an informant for the MSO. The parliamentary commission subsequently examined documents and called major general Ferenc Hamar, the deputy chief director of the MSO, for questioning. But, in the final analysis, the parliamentarians felt that they had been provided with insufficient information from which to evaluate the MSO's possible culpability in the failure to find the serial murders.³⁵ In the Summer of 2011, more details emerged in the press. István Csontos had enjoyed a much longer relationship with the MSO than originally suspected. It initially recruited him as an informer during his military service; he continued to inform till mid-2009.³⁶ But all this had been withheld from the parliamentary commission leading members to conclude that the inquiry had been abused by the MSO. Security expert Péter Tarjányi stated that that he was seriously worried about what more was yet to be found. 'The last murder in Kisléta could have been prevented if each person from each relevant authority had just done what they should have done. In my opinion, the possibility that the last victim was killed by the Roma hunters due to the gross negligence of the Military Security Office is higher than the possibility that all this is mere fantasy.'³⁷

In Germany too, the Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD) had its own informer network on the neo-Nazi scene. (Recruits were identified when they undertook military service.) MAD was party to the 1997-2003 Operation Rennsteig aimed at recruiting neo-Nazi informers in the THS, which included Mundlos, Bönhardt and Zschäpe.³⁸ (The shredding of documents relating to Rennsteig has been dubbed 'the Confetti Affair'.)³⁹ During the Parliamentary Commission, it emerged that Mundlos was asked by the military to act as an informer in 1995 – and refused. The military was fully aware of his Nazi connections, and during his service he was promoted to armoured infantryman (though MAD initially attempted to withhold this information from the parliamentary commission).⁴⁰ One of the four Munich trial co-defendants – known as André E (charged with acting as an accessory to murder and

other offences connected to the 2004 bomb attack in Cologne which left twenty-two injured) was also asked to act as an informer. At the time of his conscription, he sported a Blood & Honour tattoo and quickly made his National Socialist views known. Yet he was trained in the use of assault rifles, automatic pistols and hand grenades.⁴¹ Yet MAD is meant to ensure that no one works for the army who 'does not defend the liberal, democratic Constitution of Germany' and it is known that neo-Nazis infiltrate the army to get training in arms and combat. (Conscription ended in Germany in 2011.)

When negligence becomes collusion

One might well question how security services, presumably run by those with intelligence skills and able minds, can make such errors of judgement when it comes to the surveillance and containment of the far Right. One answer is that perspectives, especially in Germany are a product of the Cold War. The pre-unification mindset (against the Communist East) still prevails, with the Left seen as a greater threat to democracy than the Right.

And, by their very nature, intelligence services place a premium on information, not crime prevention. In the European context, this means that the policing of racist violence against the Roma in Hungary, or the Turkish community in Germany, for instance, will not be prioritised. In my research I found no sense that states and intelligence services perceived the far Right as a threat to national security. Thus covert policing was not accompanied by, for instance, proscription, preventative arrest, detention without trial, or any of the other kind of emergency measures available. The racism and ultra-patriotism of the far Right were not considered a direct threat to the state and its institutions. It was the lack of knowledge about secretive, illegal and possible paramilitary activities (such as import of arms, evidence of bomb-making) which was considered a challenge that needed to be addressed. Hence the primary purpose of the covert policing of the far Right in all three countries was to penetrate areas where official state agencies could not normally operate, so as to maintain lines of communication within the fascist movement, even at the expense of passing on crucial information to the police.

The dangers inherent in this kind of covert policing, at any cost, are now being boldly addressed in Northern Ireland where British collusion with Loyalist paramilitaries has a long history. The chapter and verse of the incendiary effect of covert policing in Northern Ireland is outlined in *The Policing You Don't See*, a very important

recent report from the Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAD) in Belfast.⁴² The issues now being brought to light in Germany, Austria and Hungary, as to how far secret services can and do act outside democratic structures, have been debated by necessity in Northern Ireland. There, methods to prevent officers, agents and handlers from being held to account, are generally seen as collusion. Such collusion was defined, in Sir John Stevens 2003 inquiry the death of the human rights lawyer Pat Finucane, as encompassing a range of actions including the 'wilful failure to keep records, the absence of accountability, the withholding of intelligence and evidence, through to the extreme of agents being involved in murder'. The second 2004 inquiry into Finucane's death by the retired Canadian Judge Peter Cory adopted an even broader definition of collusion which was understood as 'the involvement of state agents, directly or indirectly, through commission, collaboration or connivance, in non-state political violence.'⁴³

It is this definition and the far-reaching analysis provided by CAD that is so apt for discussing covert policing of the far Right in Europe. For CAD shows the link between covert policing and the running of agents with the establishment of a culture of state collusion in human rights abuses and crime, which, in turn, leads to a climate of impunity in which agents carry out operations in the belief that they will neither be detected nor held to account for such crimes. In Northern Ireland, a number of recurring practices emerged, encompassing the state operating outside the rule of law, collusion and facilitating impunity. Crucially, a culture of 'concealing the evidence' by destroying the paper trail arose as a deliberate strategy to ensure 'plausible deniability' of activities should 'inconvenient facts' about the security services be uncovered.

As the German parliamentary inquiry now comes to an end and politicians have to consider the 'memory losses' of so many state agents and the documents that they could not see (because they were shredded or missing) they would be well advised to read CAJ's stark and thoughtful report.

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20 'Ignorance, bias fueled neo-nazi killings: MP', *Hürriyet Daily News*, 14 November 2012, <<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ignorance-bias-fueled-neo-nazi-killings-mp.aspx?pageID=238&nid=34597>>.

21 Institutional racism was first officially defined in the UK by Sir William Macpherson in the report issued after the inquiry into the murder of Stephen Lawrence and subsequent police investigation. See The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry Report (London, Home Office, 1999) CM 4262.

22 See Arun Kundnani, 'Blind Spot? Security Narratives and far-Right Violence in Europe', International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague, 2012, <<http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Kundnani-Blind-Spot-June-2012.pdf>>.

23 As cited by Agence France Presse, <<http://www.arabnews.com/germany-vows-shake-after-neo-nazi-probe>>.

24 One of the agents, states Sailer, was a 'sympathising member' of 'Arminia Czernowitz' (one of the far Right university fraternities that organises the annual Wiener Korporations Ball which attracts the likes of Marine Le Pen to Vienna). The second agent allegedly had ties with Erhard Weinzinger, the Chair of the Freedom Party in Schärding, Northern Upper Austria. In informal settings, according to Sailer, this agent regularly labelled the Green Party left-wing extremists, and also made homophobic remarks. See Profil Online, op.cit

25 Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, European Roma Rights Centre, Legal Defence Bureau for National and Ethnic Minorities, 'Report on the circumstances of the double murder committed at Tatárszentgyörgy on 23 February 2009 and conduct of the acting authorities (police, ambulance and fire services)', <<http://www.errc.org/cms/upload/media/03/DA/m000003DA.pdf>>.

26 See ERRC, 18 February 2010, <<http://www.errc.org/article/hungarian-head-of-police-acknowledges-violation-of-the-victims-right-to-fair-procedure-one-year-after-the-double-murder-committed-in-tatarszentgyorgy/3064>>.

27 See *Stern*, 22 January 2007, <[\[politik/deutschland/geheime-bka-tarifordnung-was-verdienen-polizei-spitzel-580838.html\]\(http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/geheime-bka-tarifordnung-was-verdienen-polizei-spitzel-580838.html\)>.](http://www.stern.de/poli-</p></div><div data-bbox=)

28 Maik Baumgärtner, Hubert Gude and Holger Stark, 'Neo-Nazi terror cell: intelligence agency hindered murder probe', Spiegel Online International, <<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/hesse-intelligence-agency-hindered-murder-investigation-a-853669-2.html>>.

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30 See Bayerischer Rundfunk, Ulrich Chaussy, September 2012, <http://web.ard.de/media/pdf/radio/radiofeature/genosse_quelle_sendemanuskript.pdf>.

31 'Incendiary Informants: Did German Intelligence Fuel Far-Right Extremism?', Spiegel International Online, 6 November 2012, <<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-police-document-says-informants-fuelled-far-right-extremism-a-865461.html>>.

32 Sven Heymann, 'Germany: Inquiry committee posts interim report on neo-Nazi terrorist group', World Socialist Web, 19 March 2013, <<http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/03/19/neon-m19.html>>.

33 See <<http://www.profil.at/articles/1306/560/351822/lange-leitung-neonazi-ring-oberoesterreich>>.

34 'Führungslove V-Mann-Führung', *Zeit*, 28 February 2013, <<http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2013-02/nsu-ausschuss-v-mann-tino-brand>>. The parliamentary commission has established that no fewer than thirty-five preliminary investigations by public prosecutors into Brandt's activities were abandoned, presumably to protect his identity. On the other hand, Thomas S, a paid informant for the Berlin criminal police (LKA-Berlin), who had been romantically involved with Zschäpe in the mid-1990s, and is said to have supplied the NSU with explosives before they went underground in 2008, is believed to have given his police handler a tip off as to the trio's whereabouts in 2002, four years after they disappeared. But this tip off (as well as four tip offs in 2005) does not seem to have been passed on, and it seems likely that the Berlin police did not inform the BfV that they had recruited Thomas S, and in January 2013, it emerged that all police and intelligence files on him had gone missing. It is the scandal surrounding this that has engulfed the interior ministry of Berlin, with interior minister Frank Henkel failing to appear before the NSU Investigative Committee to account for the actions of the LKA.

35 On the Responsibility of the Hungarian State and the National Security Service in Connection with the Attacks against Roma claiming six lives (2008-2009), *op.cit.*

36 *Ibid.*

37 *Ibid.* In September 2012, Adam Ficsor, the government minister responsible for overseeing the work of the National Security Services (NSS) acknowledged that mistakes had been made. He said that the NSS had played an important role in detecting the perpetrators but that the NSO had made mistakes without which the names of the suspects could have been revealed earlier. See <http://cigany-vadaszat-per.blog.hu/2012/08/20/egy_jelentes_jelentes>.

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39 Matthias Gebauer, 'Neo-Nazi terror: Interior Ministry ordered destruction of intelligence files', *Spiegel Online International*, 19 July 2012.

40 Matthias Gebauer, 'Neo-nazi terror cell: Intelligence agency tried to recruit Uwe Mundlos', *Spiegel Online International*, 12 September 2012, <<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/intelligence-agency-tried-to-recruit-neo-nazi-terrorist-uwe-mundlos-a-855456.html>>.

41 'Neonazis in der Bundeswehr', *Taz*, 7 November 2012, <<http://www.taz.de/Neonazis-in-der-Bundeswehr/!105086/>>.

42 *The Policing You Don't See: covert policing and the accountability gap: five years on from the transfer of National Security primacy to MI5*, Committee on the Administration of Justice, 2011, <<http://www.caj.org.uk/contents/1141>>.

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